Deciphering U.S. strategic intentions in the Middle East by tracking the movement of major ships has become increasingly complex. Presently, two U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, the Lincoln and the Roosevelt, are stationed in the Gulf of Oman, accompanied by eight U.S. destroyers, likely supported by two nuclear attack submarines nearby, and a substantial number of aircraft. Meanwhile, in the Eastern Mediterranean, the U.S. has deployed a single Amphibious Ready Group—a contingent of Marines aboard lightly armed amphibious ships—protected by the Royal Navy destroyer HMS Duncan. However, in the Red Sea, where Houthi militia attacks on international shipping persist and an abandoned oil tanker has been burning for nearly two weeks, there are no U.S. warships present.
This situation reveals several key insights, some obvious, others both concerning and perplexing.
First and foremost, it is clear that countering Iran is currently the top priority for the U.S. Many might argue that this has always been the case, but the deployment of two carriers in the region underscores the immediacy of this focus. The urgency is so pronounced that these significant naval assets have been redirected from the Pacific Command, leaving the Western Pacific without a carrier for the first time since 2001—a striking indication of the U.S. Navy's stretched resources, operating as an eleven-carrier fleet in a world that arguably demands fifteen.
This absence is drawing ire from China hawks, as Chinese coastguard vessels aggressively confront Filipino ships and Chinese aircraft encroach upon Japanese airspace. While these actions are not solely due to the lack of U.S. carriers in the region, the absence certainly does not deter them.
Pacific Command has emphasized that "fleet forces include several warships operating across the Pacific, working to promote adherence to a rules-based international order." However, without the presence of aircraft carriers, their public relations teams often face significant challenges.
The fact that both carriers are not stationed in the Persian/Arabian Gulf itself is notable. Iran possesses thousands of ballistic missiles, drones, and fast attack craft that could pose a threat in such confined waters, making it easier to locate and potentially target a carrier. Since the late 1980s, Iran has been developing weapons and tactics specifically designed to be difficult for NATO forces to counter.
If there is any concern about escalation—and the carriers' positioning suggests there is—they are strategically positioned at a distance where they can maintain their safety, have time to counter incoming attacks, and still deploy over a hundred strike aircraft and missile cells, including Tomahawk cruise missiles, at a moment's notice. The USS Roosevelt, equipped with the F35C stealth fighter, boasts one of the most capable air wings in the world.
Meanwhile, the Eastern Mediterranean has been relatively quiet, which is likely a positive sign. The Gaza aid pier has been dismantled and forgotten, and the USS Wasp and her group are on standby to evacuate non-combatants from the region if the situation in Lebanon escalates. This arrangement positions two massive ships aimed at Iran, prepared for potential conflict while hoping to serve as a deterrent. Additionally, there is a group in the Eastern Mediterranean ready to respond if deterrence fails. So far, this strategy appears logical.
However, the situation in the Red Sea is more perplexing. Since last October, the approach has seemed unclear. Initial attacks prompted an influx of U.S. warships, including the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, leading to the creation of the defensive U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian in December to reassure shipping. Unfortunately, this came too late for several major shipping companies, which had already opted to route around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid the increasingly indiscriminate Houthi missile threat.
U.S. efforts to rally other navies were only partially successful, with the EU mission Aspides splitting off around the same time, primarily for political reasons. This division was operationally suboptimal and did not project a unified front to reassure shipping, creating a poor optical effect.
While it's not uncommon for multiple groups to operate side by side, what puzzled many observers was how long it took the U.S. to respond with force. Operation Poseidon Archer didn’t commence until January 11, two and a half months after U.S. ships had been targeted, either directly or while defending merchant vessels. In contrast, when the Houthis fired at the USS Mason in 2016, the USS Nitze retaliated with Tomahawk missiles within four days.
There are three main reasons for this hesitance. The first is the fear of escalating tensions with Iran. Striking the Houthis too aggressively could quickly lead to another distant war, something millions of American voters understandably want to avoid. The second reason is that since 2016, the Houthis have learned much from Iran about evasion and concealment, making it difficult to strike them effectively without a massive, costly, and aggressive effort—see point one. The final reason is the growing perception that the United States no longer prioritizes freedom of navigation in this region, especially in a chokepoint that doesn’t significantly impact the US directly.
There was also a lack of a comprehensive solution. The anti-piracy efforts of the 2010s demonstrated that the answer to such issues rarely lies at sea. If diplomatic, economic, interdiction, and lower-level technological solutions were being employed here, they were not apparent. In short, Operation Prosperity Guardian was always just a temporary fix.
Over time, the number of ships intercepting missiles and escorting merchant vessels dwindled. In May, the Eisenhower left the area, taking its group with it, and now there are none. This leaves only the French and Italians as active contributors under Operation Aspides.
However, a critical issue in the Red Sea remains unresolved. Thirteen days ago, the oil tanker MV Sounion was attacked by the Houthis. A French Aspides ship responded, destroying an approaching surface drone, extinguishing initial fires, and evacuating the crew to Djibouti. After the ship was abandoned at anchor, the Houthis returned two days later, planted explosives, and filmed the explosion for social media.
The ship has been burning ever since, with the condition of the underdeck deteriorating. Although merchant vessels are known for their strength, a fire like this will eventually spread and compromise the hull’s watertight integrity. If the 150,000 tonnes of heavy crude onboard were to spill, it would be four times the amount spilled by the Exxon Valdez. Currently, there is already a 4-kilometer oil slick emerging from the Sounion.
Lloyd’s List warns of the potential disaster:
“Sounion is laden with 150,000 tonnes of heavy crude, and if it loses that cargo, the result would be oil pollution on a scale not seen from shipping this century…devastating the local fishing industry, a key source of food in a country where 17 million people suffer from acute food insecurity, according to UN estimates.”
That country is Yemen, where the Houthis now control most populated areas. Many on social media argue that since the Houthis caused the problem, they should solve it. However, they cannot, and they would likely attack anyone attempting to salvage the Sounion.
In a world where international law and human decency still matter, rapid action is necessary. But there’s no easy solution, and in the past, action has been anything but swift.
The 2002 attack on Limburg by Al Qaeda in Yemen revealed how quickly international systems for compensating for environmental disasters collapse when explosives are involved. Similarly, funding this salvage operation is a challenge. The International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, which would typically intervene at this point, has confirmed that they are “constitutionally precluded” from providing funds when spills result from acts of war.
As with most maritime issues, nothing is straightforward.
However, something is finally happening today. Following negotiations with Sounion’s owners, Delta Tankers, three salvage tugs—Gladiator, Hercules, and Red Bull—are en route to the scene. To add another complication, the two southern tugs are under US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions, which need to be lifted for them to be used.
Delta Tankers has not been helpful, responding to all inquiries with the vague statement, “We can’t comment for security reasons.” This outdated response leaves a vacuum the Houthis are eager to fill. The fact that many people have bought into the Houthi narrative that this disruption is related to Gaza rather than their desire to appear powerful underscores this issue.
Salvage company Boskalis, which was involved in the salvage of the FSO Safer, a similarly abandoned oil tanker off Hodeidah that took eight years to resolve, has also been contacted. Boskalis has said they are on standby to assist “but first the ship must be brought to a safe location.”
This is reasonable. Just yesterday, two more tankers, the MV Blue Lagoon and the MV Amjad (carrying double the oil of the Sounion), were both struck by ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial systems.
All of this circles back to the US’s growing reluctance to lead in this region. Less than two days away by sea is a carrier group that could provide a protective bubble around the salvage effort, ensuring its safety. The US could have already lifted the sanctions on the tugs, secured a salvage team, and brought the situation under control 10 days ago if it wanted to. The salvagers and tugs would be compensated by the ship’s owners, meaning there would be no cost to the US. Now, it seems the protection task will fall to the remaining Aspides ships, which would likely admit that having a carrier nearby would be beneficial.
The US could have done all this while maintaining the moral high ground and showing the Houthis that even if the US is over the horizon, it still means business. In my view, this would have been a win-win.
It may seem unfair to continually expect the US to take the lead in situations like this, but when it steps back, a vacuum is created—and eventually, that vacuum will be filled.
China now maintains a standing destroyer squadron in the Gulf region. While they haven’t intervened in this instance, the future is approaching. After all, China needs the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait open more than the US does.
Had China intervened, its sailors could have, for once, used their firefighting equipment for a good cause.
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